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THE CONFLICTING LEGAL PRESSURES ON THE
MODERN HOSPITAL
ERIC W. SPRINGER*
I. OVERVIEW
Modern health care institutions face a concatenation of critical chal-
lenges which threaten the stability, or even the existence, of all but the
most firmly managed and fiscally sound. Many of these challenges are
of national, if not international, dimensions. There is little an individ-
ual hospital can do to affect challenges and pressures of this size.
A discrete group of lesser and possibly more manageable challenges
also commands the attention of hospital management and medical staff
leadership. This group is characterized by the dilemmas caused by the
increasingly active intervention of the legal system. Conflicting inter-
ests are clearly reflected in these challenges, however, it is not at all
obvious which interest is "right" and which is "wrong." Indeed. a sig-
nificant characteristic of this phenomenon is the fact that decision-mak-
ers cannot decide on the basis of the usual differential equations of
"good" and "bad" or "best case" and "worst case." In this context, the
competing interests are often equally compelling and have comparable
equities.
One need only think of current controversial confusion raised by the
"right to life" versus the "right to abortion" dispute. Similarly troub-
ling moral, philosophical, and legal issues are inherent in questions re-
garding the initiation or withdrawal of extraordinary medical measures
for terminally ill or comatose patients.
The relatively recent invasion of law into what was a rather calm and
quiet. if not altogether untroubled house of healing, has brought about
something close to the dissonance usually associated with the Tower of
Babel. Indeed, reference to Bedlam may be more apt if one reflects on
the crazy cacophony which results when the subjects of law and
medicine are discussed-even by serious students of either, or both.
I mean not to gainsay the effect of exploding technology on this sub-ject. However, if not for the law, the "'science" of medicine could and
would move inexorably onward at a pace medicine dictated. The in-
trusion of the law complicates the decision-makers' efforts. The recog-
Panncr in the firm of tiony. Springer & Maitcrn. Pittsburgh. Pa.
1
Springer: The Conflicting Legal Pressures on the Modern Hospital
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1983
CONFLICTING PRESSURES
nition of new types and levels of legal rights has created conflicts for
all. Even the most astute and sensitive individuals in this field are
stymied by the hard choices presented in day-to-day medical practice.
Technological advance, moreover, further compounds the dilemma. It
is an article of national faith that science means progress and that pro-
gress is always good. However, in health matters, progress often leads
to tough questions for which there are no acceptable answers. The
faith in science and the scientific method leads to beliefs as metaphysi-
cal and mystical as those of our forefathers.
The broad perspective of this article will disclose great dissonance, if
not madness, in the medical world. The law has always been involved
with health in one way or another. From earliest times to now, the law.
taking that to mean the vague, disparate miscellany of statutes, judicial
decisions, regulations. pronouncements, and doctrines we all hold dear.
has encouraged, inhibited, and been indifferent to health concerns.
Moreover, the law displays this same range of contrariety to both
health care providers and their patients. Throughout the centuries the
law has been unable to come to a practical working definition of health.
medicine, or indeed, the scopes of practice of the variety of practition-
ers who enhance or purvey it, whichever the case may be. Definitions
have been based, in part at least, upon metaphysics, mysticism. magic.
and no small amount of self-serving protectionist sentimentality.
With expanding technology and the increasing numbers of natural
and legal "persons" who have obtained authorization to practice a
health profession, the problem of definition becomes even more com-
plex. This too creates major tensions, conflicts, confusions, and dilem-
mas. Who can do what, with which, to whom? That remains the
question as the "who" is expanding, the "what" is much more complex,
the "which" is much more than we ever dreamed, and even the
"whom" is changing right before our eyes.
American laws affecting health matters are in transition. As the na-
tion has become more aware of the vital importance of health in public
and private matters and as the many definitions of health have ex-
panded, there is an increasing legal focus on the availability, appropri-
ateness, and quality of health care services. At precisely the same time
there are pressures, reaching critical mass conditions, for the reduction
of health care costs. In this process new legal duties and responsibili-
ties are articulated in an expanding and confusing calculus. There are
no easy formulas with which to resolve the conflicting legal pressures.
As examples of these pressures, this Article will discuss hospital rela-
tionships with health practitioners and issues involving competing pres-
sures for disclosure or non-disclosure of health information.
Clearly, the law can raise issues aplenty. However, we must ask
2
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whether the legal system can provide a mechanism which will rational-
ize, change, and assist in the orderly transition from situations we
thought we could manage to those which are difficult and perhaps un-
manageable. This question is difficult to answer at the present time. It
is my belief that many of these issues can be managed, even if only on
an ad hoc basis, when institutional leadership has the foresight. wis-
dom. creativity, and resolve to make a decision and to take action.
However, it is not clear whether American health leadership exhibits
such capability. Perhaps this pessimistic speculation is based on the
nature of the peculiarly American legal process and how it has been
applied to health matters.
II. THE HOLMESIAN CONCEPT OF FELT NEEDS
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Jr., sat for some thirty years on the United
States Supreme Court. Prior to that, he sat for seventeen years on the
Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts com-
pleting his term as Chief Justice. Early in his life. Justice Holmes was a
lecturer on common. law at the Lowell Institute in Boston. The lectures
he gave there were converted into a book called The Common Las.' a
work of high erudition and importance. In his book, Justice Holmes
put forth a definition of law that is most appropriate to this discussion:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed. . . . The substance of the law at any given time pretty
nearly corresponds. so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be
convenient: but its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is
able to work out desired results, depend very much-upon its past.2
To a very large extent. the life of the American health care system
has had the same experience. Medicine has grown, diversified, and ex-
panded in response to the expressed desires of some part of society to
solve what it perceived to be mysteries of illness and disease. Over the
years. specific kinds of health concerns have received special attention.
Great exertions of time and energy have been made, and large infu-
sions of public and private dollars have been allocated and expended.
The fact that technological change may have created those illnesses and
diseases which captured our attention is irrelevant for the purpose of
this discussion. Likewise, the fact that there was (and will be) some
1 O W Iiozl.'Js. TIlE CoNMoN LAW (189 1).
2. Id at 1-2.
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element of favoritism, special pleading. and fadism is irrelevant. There
were felt needs, and some part of the legal or health care process
responded.
For every reponse to a felt need there will eventually be an equal and
opposite reaction. Lawyers and physicians alike have learned from
past experiences and have attempted to apply that knowledge to some
currently articulated felt necessity. Both law and medicine have long
standing traditions, both professions are challenged today as never
before. It is noteworthy that this challenge occurs because more is ex-
pected of the two professions and because neither lawyers nor physi-
cians control their systems as they did before. The public demands that
these two professions especially respond to its newly noted needs. But
the lawyers and physicians cannot.
Medicine specifically faces a social and legal confrontation today
that it has never faced before in its long history. Its practitioners and
specialists are for many reasons completely ill prepared to deal with
these assaults. At the same time the public has grown more sophisti-
cated and now demands much more from physicians without giving in
return what has been for a century at least a reverence almost akin to
that which the laity formerly extended to the clergy. Today. however.
the public views medicine in a totally different light. Attitudes of awe
and respectful hope have changed across the nation. The general pop-
ulation now has high expectations and little patience with explanations
that attempt to show why health care of the highest quality and in the
most advanced state of the art cannot be delivered right now to every-
one at the very lowest costs.
Meanwhile the legal system. pressured by increasing demands for the
infinitely changing and illusive thing called quality (and the similarly
troubling notion of equality) creates new kinds of duties and responsi-
bilities and imposes them not only on the practitioners but also the
institutions where the practitioners perform. This phenomenon of in-
stitutional or corporate responsibility has been the subject of a number
of thoughtful articles and will not be pursued at this point.
So-called corporate or institutional liability is vicarious responsibil-
ity in a new garb. Demands for institutional liability impose on hospi-
tals and other health care facilities duties which can only be carried out
by specifically licensed practitioners. Hospitals face the overriding
pressure imposed by the legal system to correct, modify, or structure
the behavior of the private practitioners who have permission to per-
form professionally in the institution. Accordingly, hospitals have the
difficult job of balancing the competing scopes of practice between
"traditional" practitioners and recently recognized health care profes-
sionals. Another logical battleground of emerging legal significance is
4
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that involving healthcare information. We shall have more to say on
these issues presently.
Once again we are in crisis. This time. the writers and editorialists
inform us, it is a health care crisis. It seems that every generation or so
America rediscovers a "crisis." All the forces of society bewail the
newly found old problem. Think, if you will, of the recurrent racial.
economic, environmental, or educational crises. They and the crisis in
health care are all similar. We have heard it all before. These recur-
rent crises symbolize the inability of the American political, social, eco-
nomic, and legal systems to deal lastingly and finally with human
problems. It is perhaps true that no such systems can deal lastingly and
finally with human problems.
Social change is occurring every day: physical change goes on. Felt
needs today are different, and these changes have an impact on the
demand for medical care. Indeed, the changing values of Americans
have much to do with the demand for higher quality health care, and
consequently the manner in which the law may be employed to achieve
that end. This change in values is fundamental, and yet our responses
to the demand may be the same as those employing the frame of refer-
ence which we formerly used when dealing with problems of this na-
ture. That is, the attempt to meet this felt need may be made in the
context of the notions implicit in the doctrine of laissezfaire. or in
terms of true socialism.
The system of values developed during the early phase of industriali-
zation in United States history no longer seems applicable to emerging
institutional, group, and individual patterns. A great many forces are
working to hasten these shifts in values. They intermesh at different
speeds and tempos for different people, and they work differently from
one place to another. Among these contrasting forces are growing na-
tional affluence and poverty, increasing societal complexity as life be-
comes simpler, and increasing national insecurity about and confidence
in the future. Other forces at work are heightened rates of change. ex-
ploding technology, upheavals in theology, changing notions of moral-
ity, the ascendancy of "youth values," strong demands from so-called
minorities, new roles for business and government, wider accessibility
of the mass media of communication, innovative use of collective ac-
tion and confrontation, and a conviction among many Americans that
the nation has not lived up to its promises and ideals, explicit or
implicit.
Under the circumstances, standards of what is important - what
should have priority in a hierarchy of priorities - are changing. Even
the upper-middle class American finds that the attainment of status
and material goals is so relatively easy that the quest for them no
5
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longer offers a challenge. Rather than face a lifetime of futility and
senseless pursuit of material objects, some people, at almost every level
of life, are seeking different goals based on different ("higher") values.
Taken together these forces, events, and trends indicate a time of rapid
and fundamental shifts in the core of values by which most Americans
live. Moreover, in all areas of life these shifts augur new assaults on
the established way of doing things, such as providing services and re-
dressing grievances. The law as Justice Holmes described it is inti-
mately involved in providing supportive mechanisms for the
implementation and realization of the felt needs of society as they come
to be expressed. Thus the law is grappling with bringing about change.
At the same time, it is a most effective instrument against change.
National affluence, coupled with the accessibility and influence of
the mass media, has an important additional impact; it facilitates the
expression. dissemination, and acceptance of personal, community, and
national values. Values tend to be generated by the basic needs that
people have. Simply stated, needs dictate values by defining what is
most important. The United States has departed from what might be
called the frontier frame of reference, by which I mean not only the
conquest of land but also the control of the economy under the concept
of free enterprise and the notion of "survival of the fittest" as it applies
to human relations. We have evolved into a society that is more so-
cially oriented, more organized, and more institutionalized. As this has
happened and as affluence has reached larger portions of the popula-
tion. the felt needs of the people have changed from that of basic sur-
vival in a competitive setting to sophisticated concerns for self-growth
and self-actualization. This would seem to indicate that the individual
in this day and in the years to come will be more concerned with per-
sonal well-being and perhaps the well-being of society as well. He will
express as deep a concern for the "quality of life" as for life itself. He
will seek and demand good health care. If it cannot be found within
the present social and legal frameworks, he will develop approaches to
make sure that it will evolve. But at the same time, technological
growth and its social, economic, and moral dislocation creates precisely
contrary values. Sometimes we seem to care less about the plight of the
individual who may become more and more equated with his comput-
erized identification code. We spend more time in the quest for satis-
faction of nerve ends than in the quest of social good.
The law, it is suggested. has been and will be a vehicle to bring about
change. It will reflect the current felt necessities of these times and it
will bend to meet the current desires. But, as Justice Holmes further
described, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of pub-
lic policy, and even the prejudices that judges and other lawmakers
6
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share with their fellow beings will have considerable impact. More-
over, the changes that are effected by the law will still depend very
much upon the way things were done in the past.
From earliest times the law has had an interest in the community's
health. From the times of Moses (and even before) to the latest pro-
nouncement of the United States Supreme Court. a major concern of
the law-giver was the public health. Indeed. the primary power of the
state is the police power. Pursuant to the police power. it is the respon-
sibility of government to provide for and protect the health. safety, wel-
fare. and morals of the community. It is through the police power that
state government is active in the field of public health. The police
power extends to the person and the property of every individual and
corporation in the state. It also extends to the conduct of private mat-
ters as well as to business affairs.
It is my thesis that the law inhibits, enhances, and ignores health care
issues all at the same time. In doing so it creates for the institutional
decision-maker the conflicting pressures which lead to the dilemmas
noted above. In altogether too many situations, the law presents itself
in such a manner as to confound the average health practitioner or
health care manager. Only the most able can consistently operate ef-
fectively in this atmosphere. This Article will discuss two examples of
conflicting legal pressures as they currently affect health care institu-
tional managers.
Ill. EXAMPLES O- CONFLICTING LIGAL PRI.SSL;R-S
Almost any issue which comes to mind when one thinks of the mod-
ern health care institution will include a litany of responsibilities which
give rise to conflicting legal pressures. The list is seemingly inexhaust-
ible. The pressures which come about because of increasing the poten-
tial for malpractice liability against both the practitioner and the
institution give rise to the need for stringent internal controls on health
care delivery by each and every practitioner. These controls. which are
generally institutional, in turn create conflict centers within the institu-
tion as the hospital attempts to modify and manage the behavior 0'
physicians in areas such as medication ordering, medical record man-
aging, decisions regarding the length of a patient's hospital stay. deci-
sions regarding the amount of time that the physician must or should
spend with the patient, and in the application of technological ad-
vances. The use of equipment, new machines. and new modalities of
treatment gives rise to the clash of competing interests. There is no
question that recent drastic modification in the manner in which third-
party payors reimburse health care providers will open a latter day
Pandora's box of conflict between hospitals and practitioners.
7
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.4. Hospital Relationships With Practitioners
Putting aside problems which are foreseeable because of new reim-
bursement schemes, there are many existing examples of conflicts in-
herent in the often tense relationship between hospital management
and individual practitioner.
i. Liability for Credentialing Versus Due Process
In the matter of credentialing. the competing interests are clear. To-
day the hospital is responsible for what happens within it. This in-
cludes having a credentialing system applicable to individuals on the
medical staff. On the other hand, many a practitioner still believes that
he is suijuris. so to speak. once he is licensed and certified in a spe-
cialty. Hospitals are liable for negligence in the initial appointment
process as well as in the reappointment process.3 Hospitals have a clear
legal duty to exercise reasonable care in the selection and retention of
members of the medical staff and in the periodic granting of specialized
clinical privileges. The process through which this is done involves the
so-called organized medical staff. Too often, even at this stage of hos-
pital evolution, the members of organized medical staffls see themselves
as defenders of the private practitioner and see the private practice of
medicine in the context of absolute autonomy - the suijuris notion. It
is unimportant from the perspective of this writing whether that atti-
tude is correct or incorrect. What is noteworthy is the obvious clash
that does occur and will continue to occur when hospital management
(often including the medical staff leadership) attempts to initiate an ef-
fective peer review plan or attempts to apply the provisions of such a
plan to practitioners who have been found deficient.
Of course, this paints too broad a picture. It has been my experience
in my practice to work with a good number of dedicated medical staff
leaders who were firm. fair, and effective in enforcing medical statl"dis-
ciplinary procedures. However, most hospitals are often unable to ob-
tain or retain quality leadership over long periods of time. Presently
there is no system in any hospital which ensures the consistency of
quality medical staff leadership. Moreover, even when the leadership
perceives its mission clearly and operates efficiently, the law neverthe-
less provides an aggrieved practitioner with important guarantees of
fairness which approximate the bundle of rights associated with notions
of due process. I do not mean to criticize the application of due process
to hospital-medical staff relationships. My point is that often the hospi-
tal's legally-imposed duty to review the individuals on its medical staff
3 Elam v. College Park lop. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332. 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 j 1982): Johnson %
Maisercordia Ilosp. 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W 2d 156 (1981): Purcell v. Zimbelman. 18 Ariz. App.
75. 5001 P 2d 335 (1972)
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clashes directly with its equally compelling duty to act fairly toward the
aggrieved practitioner.4
The complex political, social, economic, and professional environ-
ment in the modem hospital further weakens the ability of hospital
management to be effective. Little is foreseeable in the immediate fu-
ture which will provide mitigation of this situation. However, both the
courts and legislatures are active. The courts are becoming more recep-
tive to novel suits alleging institutional liability for the failure to prop-
erly evaluate, reevaluate, monitor, or control the actions of the
independent practitioner in the hospital. This, of course, should act as
a stimulus to more effective peer review procedures. At the same time
the courts are quite liberal in granting judicial scrutiny of hospital dis-
ciplinary actions. One can make strong arguments for both judicial
approaches. But from the institutional perspective, competing pres-
sures (to get tough with possible malpractitioners while carefully pro-
viding due process at each stage of the activity) are often puzzling and
unworkable. Moreover, several legislatures have moved to center stage
by imposing stringent reporting requirements on hospitals which take
disciplinary actions. " This legislation often inhibits institutional action
because the consequence to the miscreant practitioner, who is after all
still a peer and perhaps a colleague. is more severe than any one wishes
to impose. The net effect of these conflicting pressures is that appropri-
ate action does not take place, patients are harmed unnecessarily, prac-
titioners are not properly guided by their peers, and hospitals are
exposed to greater risk. Recent actions at the state and federal levels
are likely to exacerbate this problem.
2. Limitations of Staff Versus Anti-trust Threats
Recently. one of the most dramatic intrusions of law into the health
field which may have long-term implications is the application of anti-
trust law to hospital operations. Most hospital organizations and many
hospital counsel are ill-prepared to deal effectively with anti-trust liti-
4 Compare Flam. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332. 183 Cal. Rptr 156. etth Miller v Eisenhower
Medical Center. 27 Cal. 3d 614. 614 P.2d 258. 166 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1980) (holding defendant hospi-
tal must either accept plaintills application for medical staff membership or conduct proceeding%
to properly apply a hospital bylaws standard which permitted denial of staff mcmber.hip upon a
showing of applicant's inability to work with other.,, when hospital had failed to find that plaintiff
applicant's inability to work with others posed a threat to the quality of the hospital's medical
care).
5 Eg . N.C. GI.N. S7AT. § 90-14 13 (1981). Under this provision the chief administr.tie
officer of every licensed hospital is required (after consultation with the chief of stalr) to rcfxrt to
the State Board of Medical Examiners revocations. suspensions, or limitation of a ph'sIcan'\
privileges to practice in the hospital, Resignations from practice in the institution mut .ilso be
reported to the State Board. Failures to repon must be reponcd by the State Board to the hopital
hearing agency. Partial immunity is provided to the administrator.
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gation. More often than not the mere threat of a suit is sufficient to
inhibit a proposed management action. Importantly, the application of
anti-trust law has come at precisely the same time that many hospitals
have been forced to make critical and far-reaching management deci-
sions regarding revision of the corporate structure, allocation of limited
physical and human resources, reorganization of hospital services, re-
alignment of professional staffing patterns, development of strategies to
maximize competitive advantage, and other business decisions which
may adversely affect heretofore sacrosanct practitioner prerogatives.
The pressures which will result from changes in the reimbursement
strategies of public and private payors will alone cause disruption of
many traditional relationships within the hospital and among varieties
of health care providers. The point to be made once again is that this
disruption will create tensions and conflicts which involve legitimate
competing interests. It will not be possible to identify the "good guys"
or the "bad guys." In this setting. even though the hospital may suc-
cessfully defend an anti-trust suit which attacked, for example. a mora-
torium on appointments in certain over-populated medical specialties.
there will be no winner. The cost of defense in terms of time, money.
and emotional expense will always be exorbitant. It will be the fate of
hospitals around the country to have to choose between the Scylla of
scrapping or deferring necessary plans because of the anti-trust threat
and the Charybdis of choosing to proceed in the certain knowledge that
at least four years will be spent in litigation.
B. Disclosure of Information
One of the clearest examples of the clash of competing interests can
be seen in laws dealing with disclosure of health information. Pres-
sures abound for increased access to medical information while, at the
same time. pressures grow for the expansion of protection from disclo-
sure. The controversy over public access to the meetings of even pri-
vate hospitals. the increasing expansion of sunshine laws to cover even
"executive sessions" of the meetings of public hospitals, and the pres-
sures from the communication mass media to get into the records and
documents of hospitals and health care facilities are current common
examples. Perhaps the most troubling to the practitioner and institu-
tion are those questions which arise within the area of defining confi-
dentiality and access. Two examples will be discussed here: peer
review protection statutes and the so-called duty t6 warn.
1. Liberal Discovery versus Peer Review Protection Statutes
The activities of hospital or medical staff review committees have
been the center of a continuing legal controversy. The requirement
10
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that such committees be established and put into operation comes from
the government as well as accrediting bodies such as the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Hospitals. The role of review committees in
improving hospital care has certainly been recognized by legislatures
and courts which have responded by creating protective legal shields to
encourage these committees. However, this body of law is still in its
infancy and is undeveloped and often unpredictable. As the work of
these committees grows in importance their reports are increasingly rel-
evant to the courts. attorneys, and others who present an equally com-
pelling need to have access to the information.
Confidentiality is crucial to every review committee in a hospital.
The committee needs confidentiality in order to be able to discuss and
evaluate a colleague's credentials or clinical performance while main-
taining an atmosphere of scientific objectivity and professional cordial-
itv within the hospital. Candor is always important. Evaluators should
not operate in an atmosphere of fear that what they say will be immedi-
ately disclosed to the public in general or to attorneys for plaintiffs in
particular. Obviously most members of review committees would be
hesitant to investigate incidents fully if their reports and recommenda-
tions could be used willy-nilly as evidence in lawsuits against them.
their hospital, or colleagues. Certainly there is validity in the desire of
an aggrieved patient to discover relevant evidence and in the need of
the judicial system to seek out the best evidence. However. these inter-
ests must be counterbalanced with the equally compelling public inter-
est in protecting and encouraging the peer review process within the
hospital. State legislatures have responded differently to these compet-
ing interests. The result is that hospitals in each state must have their
counsel carefully analyze the particular state statutes and relevent case
law in order to determine how they and their committee members are
protected. Obviously committees and their review processes should be
structured to provide maximum protection of their functions.
Within this area, there is a sub-area which involves immunity against
liability which some statutes provide for members of the committee or
persons who participate with the committee. There is also the sub-area
of access to the materials for the purposes of discovery or admissibility.
Both of these have been the subject of intense judicial activity.
Some courts have created a common law rule of absolute immunity
in the area of peer review.' Others have imposed a qualified immu-
nity." Of course the statutory immunity provides an important aid to
6 Franklin % Blink. 56 N M 585. 525 P 2d 945 (1974); tx~dlcv , Sulhant. 32 Cal App
3d 619. IOX (al Rpt,. 451 11973). Schcchct v Kcstcn. 3 Mich. App 126. 141 N.W 2d 641 (19611)
7 Mafield v (;licchcrt. 4X4 S W 2d 619 (Tex. Civ App. 1972).S'-a,) J IiORrY. iloslp-
i.m I, .w. chs 2. 5. 68 (1982)
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the members of the committee. While the protections vary from state
to state, these statutes generally provide an immunity unless there is
evidence that the member acted with malice. For example, in Dub;' v.
Baron.! the court considered the Massachusetts Peer Review Statute
which provides in part:
No member of a professional society or of a duly appointed committee
thereof, or a duly appointed member of a committee of a medical staff
of a licensed hospital shall be liable in a suit for damages as a result of
his acts. omissions or proceedings undertaken or performed within the
scope of his duties as such committee member, provided that he acts in
good faith and in the reasonable belief that based on all of the facts the
action or inaction on his part was warranted.'
In Dubr a surgeon brought suit against a peer review committee and a
hospital after his clinical privileges at the hospital were terminated.
The facts which prompted the determination were that following a
therapeutic abortion the patient's condition deteriorated. The surgeon
took no action in response to the patient's condition until after he had
received repeated telephone messages from the nursing staff and a se-
vere warning by the chief of obstetrics at the hospital. The surgeon
performed an operation after the warning- but made no notation of
either operation on the hospital records. The chief of surgery was in-
formed of this situation and was aware of previous incidents involving
this surgeon. In response, the chief of surgery suspended the surgeon's
surgical privileges even though he knew that the surgeon had another
abortion scheduled two days later.
The chief of surgery then sent letters to the Executive Committee and
Credentials Committee of the hospital reporting the situation to date
and recommending that the surgeon be deprived of surgical privileges.
The Executive Committee and Credentials Committee voted to sus-
pend the surgeon temporarily. After various hearings and votes, the
aggrieved surgeon was stripped of hospital privileges indefinitely. He
brought suit against certain hospital administrators, Credentials Com-
mittee members, and the entire Executive Committee. The trial court
found that the Executive Committee had acted within the scope of its
duties concerning the surgeon, that the facts supported the finding that
each defendant had acted in good faith, and that based on all the facts.
the action or inaction was warranted. These findings were affirmed on
appeal.
The fact that courts have almost uniformly decided in favor of pro-
tecting the activities of members of peer review committees with respect
8 369 Mass. 614. 341 N.E.2d 870 (19 76). See alsO J. IokTY. supra note 7. at chs. 2.6. 46.
9 MXs~s A... LAws ch. 231. § 85N (Mzchie/Law. Co-op 1974).
12
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to their deliberations should not give anyone the notion that these com-
mittees are absolutely protected. The protection is qualified. The com-
miuees and their individual members must act without malice.
However, statutes clearly provide a rationale for committees to act with
candor and forthrightness because they are protected in their
deliberations.
Regarding the question of discovery and admissibility, there is much
more judicial activity and much more uncertainty. While the rationale
for protection against discovery and admissibility can be as clearly ar-
ticulated as it was in Bredice v. Doctors' Hospital. Inc. .o there is, never-
theless, great controversy. The courts have varied widely in their
interpretations of the scope of the statute while, at the same time, they
have attempted to come to some rough approximation of justice.
Courts have reached conflicting results in cases involving plaintiffs
who were former patients and who sought to obtain information from
the reports of the deliberations of the peer review committees in order
to make the case of negligence. In Bredice ;. Doctors' Hospital. Inc..
the District Court for the District of Columbia invoked a common law
privilege for peer review records." However. in Dar'ison v. St. Paul Fire
d Marine Insurance Co. -' the Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to
recognize the Bredice privilege. There an injured patient brought a tort
action against a hospital and its insurer to recover damages for alleged
negligence and medical malpractice in his care and treatment. The
Wisconsin court refused to recognize the privilege and refused to pre-
vent the deposition of the members of the committee. The court dis-
missed the hospital's argument that committee minutes and reports
were privileged by saying there was no specific statute which protected
them.
California has a strinf of cases interpreting the California peer re-
view protection statute.'- California's statute protects the comments of
committee members and the written committee records from discovery
or admissibility in a malpractice case. However, the statute also pro-
vides that there shall be no privilege in a lawsuit brought by a physi-
cian who has been investigated by a committee when the suit is based
on that investigation. But even in that setting the California courts.
and indeed many courts, will strictly construe the statute in its specific
lM. SO F R D, 249 tD.D.C. 1970). "Confidentiality is essential to crective functioning of
thesc Ipecr rc,,cwI stafr meetings: and these meetings are essential to thc continued improvement
in the care and treatment of patients.- Id. at 250.
II Id. at 251
12 75 Wis. 2d 190. 248 N.W.2d 433 11977).
13 See Matchett v. Superior Court. 40 Cal. App. 3d 623. 115 ("al. Rptr. 317 (1974) (holding
statute protecting applicant for hospital staff privileges does not permit discovery of proceedings
and records by patient who brings suit against doctor and against hospital for negligently allowing
stair privilcgesi
13
Springer: The Conflicting Legal Pressures on the Modern Hospital
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1983
CONFLICTING PRESSURES
terms.14
There is no question that this conflict will go on. The peer review
committees, to the extent that they are effective, will produce valuable
information which will be helpful to a variety of disparate interests.
The reports will clarify facts, they will consist of salient facts. This is
precisely the information that is needed by any person engaged in liti-
gation. So the pressure for disclosure will continue and even mount.
Interestingly enough, the ineffectiveness of peer review process is also a
fact which may bear on allegations of institutional negligence. A plain-
tiff will seek such records in any event. The courts will continue to be
called upon in an attempt to resolve these issues. Courts will not only
apply the particular language of the statute but also strong equity
considerations.
2. Physician-Patient Privilege versus Duty to Warn
The final area to be discussed in this Article is the problem presented
by a line of cases which impose upon physicians, and inferentially hos-
pitals. a duty to disclose information which arises in the physician-pa-
tient relationship. The definitive articulation of this notion came in
Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California.' In Taraso f"
suit was brought against the Regents of the University, psychothera-
pists employed by the University Hospital. and campus police to re-
cover for the murder of plaintiff's daughter by a psychiatric patient. In
October of 1969 a man named Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana
Tarasoff. The plaintiffs in the case. Tatiana's parents. alleged that two
months earlier Poddar had confided his intention to kill Tatiana to Dr.
14 F g . Smith v. State. 298 N.C. 115. 257 S.E.2d 399 (1979). Plaintffdoctor was disnid
a% a ,uperintendent of a state hospital for mentally disordered patients after refusing to turn o% cr
to his immediate superior tapes of a Credential Committee's meeting requested to investigate t',o
deaths within the hospital, and containing information as to a staff doctor's conduct in refusing to
verify the deaths. Plaintiff relied on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-8.1 (1974). which was then applicable
to physicians in state hospitals:
No physician, psychiatrist or any other officer, agent or employee of any of the institutions or
hospitals under the managemenl. control and supervision of the Department of Human Re-
sources shall be required to disclose any information, record. report. case history or memo-
randum which may have been acquired. made or compiled in attending or treating an inmate
or patient of said institutions or hospitals in a*professional character, and which information.
records. reports, case histories and memorandums were n $cersar" in order to prescribefr or to
treat said inmate or patient or to do any actfor him in aprofe.rional capacity unless a court of
competent jurisdiction shall issue an order compelling such disclosure. (emphasis added).
The court held that the information on the tapes was not protected under N.C. Gi-.N. STAT. § 122-
8.1 (1974) because it was not necessarily within the language of the statute emphasized abuse
The court further construed the statute as inapplicable to the refusal of a state hospital superinten-
dent to turn over information to the State Department of Human Resources. charged with the
duty of overseeing state hospital administration, when it investigates complaints of medical stall'
neglect The court upheld the superintendent's dismissal finding that he had withheld the tapes to
prevent embarrassing disclosure and not to protect a doctor-patient relationship.
15. 17 Cal. 3d 425. 551 P.2d 334. 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
14
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Lawrence Moore. a psychologist employed by the Cowell Memorial
Hospital at the University of California, Berkeley. The parents alleged
that on Moore's request campus police briefly detained Poddar but re-
leased him when he appeared rational. Further, the plaintiff claimed
that a physician. Dr. Moore's superior, then directed that no further
action be taken to detain Poddar. No one warned plaintiffs of Ta-
tiana's peril. At trial the superior court sustained defendant's demurrer
without leave to amend. The Supreme Court of California held that
when a psychotherapist determines or should determine pursuant to
the standards of his profession that his patient presents a serious danger
of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to
protect the intended victim against such danger. The discharge of such
duty. the court went on, may require the therapist to take one or more
of various steps depending on the nature of the case. The court stated.
"Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely
to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances." le'
There is no question that this so-called duty to warn directly clashes
with the privilege that exists between psychiatrist and patient or psy-
chologist and patient. In fact, the decision has created no small amount
of confusion in the minds of physicians generally and psychiatrists in
particular. There is no guideline, no real criterion, to aid the physician
in making the decision as to when a threat or utterance of peril is in
fact a clear and present danger and should trigger the responses articu-
lated by the Supreme Court of California.
In a similar case the Superior Court of New Jersey followed the
Tarasof rule and applied it to a case in which a wrongful death action
was brought against a psychiatrist because one of the psychiatrist's pa-
tients murdered the plaintiffs daughter. 7 The court held that the psy-
chiatrist could be liable on the Tarasof principle. Moreover, the New
Jersey Court found another rationale for the ruling. The court analo-
gized the duty to warn in the same context as other legally imposed
duties to warn. The court noted the general rule that a person who
negligently exposes another to a contagious disease is liable in damages
when the other contracts the disease. Specifically. the court stated a
physician has a duty to warn third persons against possible exposure to
contagious or infectious diseases. Physicians must also report observed
tuberculosis, venereal disease, and various other contagious diseases as
well as certain other conditions. Thus, it used the public health duty to
warn the general population to justify a duty to warn a specific person.
16. Id. at 43. 551 P.2d at 340. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
17 McIntosh v. Milano. 168 N.J. Supcr. 466. 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
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The New Jersey Court also addressed the confidentiality issue. It
indicated that the defendant asserted the need for confidentiality in
therapy and also alleged socially undesirable ramifications, particularly
to patients and potential patients arising out of a Tarasoq--type duty
when therapists may not be able to predict dangerousness accurately.
The court opined that although confidentiality is important. the need
for confidentiality cannot be considered either absolute or decisive."
Employing the public health analogy once again, the court noted that a
patient is entitled to disclose his symptoms and condition to his physi-
cian in confidence. except where the public interest or the private inter-
est of a patient so demands. Therefore. a patient possesses a limited
right to confidentiality in extrajudicial disclosures subject to exceptions
prompted by the supervening interests of society.
Of course there are limits to the scope of this rule." In Cole t: Tar-
lor.2" the Iowa Supreme Court properly rejected a suit by a patient
against her psychiatrist on the claim that in his professional capacity he
negligently failed to prevent her from killing her husband. The court
held that there was no duty to warn in this case nor was there a duty to
prevent.":i
IV. S..MMARY AND CONCI.USIONS
Of the myriad challenges facing the modern health care institution
and the professionals who are called upon to participate in its manage-
ment there are no more diflicult ones than those which involve compet-
ing. equally compelling interests. Often the conflicts and dilemmas
they present cannot be resolved by the application of usual strategies or
conventional wisdom. Strangely. these conflicts arise due to the man-
ner in which the law intrudes into health care matters. By responding
to differing felt needs, the law often creates the dilemmas which it has
no mechanism to resolve.
It is this writer's opinion that the law will continue to encourage.
inhibit, and be indifferent to health concerns. Moreover. the challenges
which accompany that state of affairs will severely test the health pro-
fessional. Only the most resourceful, wise. creative, and resolute will
be able to manage successfully in the days to come.
IS Id at 478. 403 A.2d at 512
19 In re Votteler. 3.27 N.W .2d 759 (Iowa 1982) (psychiatrist not liable Ir f.ilure to uarn his
patient's husband %%hen. after actingso as to put the . cim on notice as to the patient's dangerous.
ne,,. the patient ran over the victim with a car).
20 301 N.W 2d 766 (Iowa 1981).
21 Id at 767-68
16
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